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DETERMINING ADEQUACY: HOW COURTS ARE 
REDEFINING STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
EDUCATIONAL FINANCE, GOALS, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Regina R. Umpstead* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Headlines during the past two decades have read that 
courts have struck down their state's school finance systems as 
unconstitutionally inadequate. In fact, twenty-one out of the 
twenty-six states in which courts have considered adequacy 
claims have had rulings that were favorable to adequacy 
plaintiffs. 1 In these rulings, states have been directed by the 
courts to redesign their school finance systems, fix outdated 
facilities, and introduce new programs and curriculum. As a 
consequence of the significant actions being taken in various 
states, adequacy has a ubiquitous presence in the educational 
policy arena. In spite of all of the discussion and action, it is not 
always clear what courts envision as "adequate" when they 
strike down a state's educational system for not meeting that 
constitutional standard. 
The meaning of the term educational "adequacy" is 
ambiguous because, like many other legal theories, it has been 
built in a piecemeal fashion from the numerous state court 
• Ms. Umpstead is currently a Ph.D. candidate in educational policy at Michigan State 
University. She began researching adequacy school finance litigation in 2004 while 
doing research at the Michigan State University Education Policy Center. She earned a 
J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School. 
1. The definition of adequacy cases used in this article include only those where 
the court relied upon its state constitution's education clause to find some aspect of its 
educational system unconstitutional. There are a few cases that meet this definition 
that have not been included in this article because they were either decided at the trial 
level or are currently pending and were therefore too difficult to obtain. See Appendix 1 
for a list of included cases. See also National Access Network, Access: Education 
Finance Litigation, http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/news/lit_news.php3 
(last visited ,Jun. 1, 2007) (listing funding litigation history for all states in the nation). 
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decisions around the country that have found their state's 
educational system to be insufficient to meet its constitutional 
duty in some respect. This ambiguity is situated in various 
aspects of the decisions. First, since the adequacy decisions are 
made at the state level, every one is unique to the state in 
which it is made. Each individual state's education clause, 
education funding system, legal and political history, and the 
role the various branches of state government play in the 
decision making process impact the definition of adequacy. 
Second, plaintiffs in adequacy lawsuits bring different 
combinations of causes of actions, arguments, supporting 
evidence, and requests for relief in their individual cases. 
Third, the deciding courts utilize different underlying 
approaches, understandings, and language to define what type 
of education their state constitution requires. 
Despite these differences, commonalities in approaches to 
defining "adequacy" can be identified. For instance, the 
underlying concepts, elements, and goals of "adequacy" can be 
delineated. In this sense, adequacy is commonly defined as a 
level of resources or inputs that is sufficient to meet defined or 
absolute, rather than relative, output standards, such as a 
minimum passing score on a state achievement test. 2 It is an 
outcome-oriented strategy. The adequacy approach emphasizes 
the quality of education itself and asks what inputs are needed 
to attain a desired level of achievement. 3 In addition, the 
features that distinguish it from other finance concepts, 
particularly equity, can be explained. In this sense, school 
finance experts recognize adequacy's focus on educational 
outputs in absolute levels of achievement rather than the 
relative distribution of educational inputs, 4 and lawyers 
classify arguments as either "adequacy" if they are based on 
state education clauses or "equity" if they are based on equal 
protection clauses. 
At their core, adequacy lawsuits are designed to garner 
increased educational funding to enhance the education offered 
within a state, typically with a focus on the poorer school 
districts. Yet in their broadest sense, adequacy cases go beyond 
----------------
2. EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FW\NCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 23 
(Helen F. Ladd et al., eds., 1999) [hereinafter EQUITY AND ADEQUACY]. 
3. Larry .J. Obhof, Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State School 
Finance Litigation, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 569, 583 (2004). 
4. EQUITY AND ADEQUACY, supra note 2. 
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this basic finance purpose and reformulate 
responsibility for and treatment of its public 
establishment, encompassing the finances, 
accountability for the outcomes of education. 
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a state's 
educational 
goals, and 
This article addresses the complexity of educational 
adequacy by examining the various definitions of "adequacy" 
used by the courts. Since definitions are important in law, 
other law and education finance commentators have examined 
the issue of the definition of adequacy from different 
perspectives. 5 This article extends the work done in these 
previous articles by outlining the full reach of adequacy as 
including a state's educational finance system, educational 
goals, and accountability mechanism. It also provides a deeper 
~-------- ---·-----·-- ---
5. Josh Kagan identified five types of adequacy definitions or approaches the 
courts have employed to determine whether a state's educational system is 
constitutionally adequate. They include the following: (1) relying on "existing 
standards and established output measurements;" (2) "future legislative definition;" (3) 
"a laundry list of outputs" the state must produce; (4) a series of educational inputs to 
ensure an adequate opportunity to learn; and (5) a list of educational inputs and 
outputs. Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting "Adequacy" in State Constitutions' 
Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2249-57 (2003). 
James Liebman and Charles Sabel examined the definitions of adequacy through the 
lens of the remedies imposed by the courts and found that courts take one of three 
possible approaches to creating workable definitions of adequacy and measures of 
progress in achieving it. They either (1) "extract standards specifying very general 
goals for the states' schools from expert accounts of well-functioning schools" (it may 
then fall to the legislature to translate these goals into a workable plan for educational 
reform); (2) "select one or more detailed models of successfully reformed schools" (school 
districts found to be violating their constitutional obligations then are required to 
choose a model or an unlisted alternative that delivers superior results); or (3) issue "a 
sibylline rejection of solutions that do not meet its adequacy standard, while remaining 
silent as to the specifics of that standard or how to comply with it." James S. Liebman 
& Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model 
of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183, 205-06 
(2003). 
Deborah Verstegen examined the school finance court decisions to determine what 
factors contributed to the success of the lawsuits. She identified a bifurcated theory of 
adequacy based on the definition of the state educational goals articulated by the 
courts. When the lawsuits were unsuccessful, the courts "invoke[d] an age-old 
minimalist standard of adequacy set down in the 1920s" that says because all students 
have access to a minimum, basic education, the system of funding is not 
unconstitutional despite disparities in quality of education and financing. When the 
adequacy lawsuits were successful, the educational responsibilities of the state were 
defined more broadly "in the context of the information age and a global economy" that 
equips children to function in this environment. Deborah A. Verstegen, The Law of 
Financing Education: Towards a Theory of Adequacy: The Continuinr; Saga of Equal 
Educational Opportunity in the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to School 
Finance Systems, 23 ST. Lours U. PUB. L. REV. 499, 507-09 (2004). 
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look into the detail from the various state court decisions about 
the underlying definitional components in the areas of the 
relevant constitutional provisions, school finance language, 
educational opportunity guarantees, and educational goals. 
The analysis begins in Section II with a brief history of the 
school finance movement. Section III explores the adequacy 
lawsuits by examining their constitutional underpinnings, the 
resulting state duties towards public education, and the 
evidence of inadequacy observed. Section IV surveys the three 
components of adequacy articulated by the courts with respect 
to funding, educational attainment goals, and accountability 
features. Part A identifies the common characteristics of 
adequacy as they relate to sufficiency of funding to provide a 
high minimum quality education and the required educational 
opportunity offered to all students. Part B discusses the 
educational goals of training the future citizens, workers, and 
participants in our country's political system. Part C 
investigates the required accountability for meeting the 
educational goals. 
The article concludes in Section V, finding that although 
the adequacy lawsuits can be broadly conceived as 
encompassing the three components of educational funding, 
goals, and accountability, it is the requirement that a state 
government provide sufficient funding for a basic quality 
education that dominates the court decisions. This funding 
requirement can be classified, in most states, as promoting a 
baseline level of funding that can be supplemented, either to 
provide additional financial assistance to schools that have 
higher educational costs or as a supplement that local residents 
are permitted to supply to their district. The educational goals 
portions of the decisions reflect the breadth of the goals 
Americans desire for our educational system to pursue, and can 
be broadly conceived as encompassing intellectual, 
professional, and political pursuits. Although courts have 
outlined broad educational goals, holding the state accountable 
for achieving them through a formal accountability system is 
not a common component of the adequacy decisions. Despite 
this fact, the importance of more carefully defining and 
achieving the goals of our educational system is likely to grow 
with the national push towards more standards and 
accountability in education. 
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II. A SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL FINANCE 
LITIGATION 
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Educational adequacy is a legal theory that calls for the 
provision of a high-minimum quality education to all of the 
students in a state. Most scholars mark its beginning with the 
1989 state court decisions in Kentucky, Texas, and Montana 
that declared their educational finance systems inadequate and 
unconstitutional based on their state education clauses.6 
The decisions in Kentucky, Texas, and Montana served as a 
break from previous school finance litigation that had already 
undergone two different waves wherein the challenges to the 
state educational systems were based on legal theories of 
equity. Wave one, which spanned the years of the late 1960s 
until the 1973 Supreme Court decision in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 7 was characterized 
by federal equal protection challenges to the state education 
systems. 8 These equality or equity suits were concerned about 
the vast financial resource differences between high-property-
wealth and low-property-wealth districts and argued that all 
children were entitled to have the same amount of money spent 
on their education ("horizontal equity"). 9 In Rodriguez, the U.S. 
Supreme Court effectively ended this line of argument when it 
upheld the Texas educational finance system against a federal 
equal protection clause challenge, saying that students living 
in poor property-wealth school districts were not an identifiable 
class of suspect persons and that education is not a 
fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution. 10 
After Rodriguez foreclosed the federal avenue, the 
challenges to the constitutionality of state education finance 
systems shifted to the state courts and the individual states' 
constitutional provisions. 11 Prominent from 1973 to 1989, the 
6. EQUITY AND ADEQUACY, supra note 2, at 56. 
7. San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
8. See William E. Thro, Issues in Education and Policy: Judicial Analysis During 
the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 
:35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 600-01 (1994); Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey 
Says? It's All dust a Change in Attitudes, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 557--59 
(Summer, 1999); EQUITY AND ADEQUACY, supra note 2, at :35-41. 
9. EQUITY AND ADEQUACY, supra note 2, at 18-20. 
10. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28, 35. 
11. Thro, supra note 8, at 601-03; Patt, supra note 8, at 559-61; EQUITY A:--JD 
ADEQUACY, supra note 2, at 41-55. 
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plaintiffs in wave two cases reasoned that education was a 
fundamental right under the state education clause, so any 
governmental interference must be examined under the strict 
scrutiny analysis of the state equal protection clause. They 
highlighted the inequitable method for funding public schools 
that made the amount of resources available to local school 
districts dependent upon the property wealth located in that 
district. Plaintiffs sought to eliminate this spending gap 
between high-wealth and low-wealth districts, relying on the 
horizontal equity concept of equal revenues for every district or 
on a vertical equity notion that all districts should have 
equality of educational opportunity in the sense that students 
in districts with higher needs should have more money spent 
on their education than those with lesser educational needs 
("vertical equity"). 12 A few plaintiffs also contended that the 
state's education clause required access to educational 
opportunities. 13 These cases were the precursors to the 
adequacy movement as we see it today. 14 
In the adequacy lawsuits of wave three, plaintiffs have 
argued that: (1) their state education clause requires that a 
specific substantive level of education, which is defined by state 
standards or goals, be provided to all students within the state; 
(2) this quality of education is not currently being supplied; 
and, therefore, (3) the state has violated its constitutional duty 
with respect to education as embodied in its education clause; 
and ( 4) the court should impose a remedy. 15 This focus on 
funding to meet specific educational outcomes or standards is a 
significant shift from the horizontal and vertical equity 
arguments from the previous two waves of litigation, which 
focused on the relative amounts of funding among groups of 
students or districts within the state. 
Under adequacy arguments, when state finance systems 
have been found unconstitutionally inadequate for not 
providing the required substantive level of education to the 
students in the state, the courts have ordered states to 
12. EQUITY AND ADEQUACY, supra note 2, at 20-21. 
13. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 
585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979). 
14. Steve Smith, Education Adequacy Litigation: History, Trends, and Research, 
27 ARK. 1. REV. 107, 111 (2004). 
15. Thro, supra note 8, at 602-04; Patt, supra note 8, at 561; EQUITY AND 
ADEqUACY, supra note 2, at 56-62. 
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reconstitute them and to provide to the school districts the 
amount of money needed to offer a constitutionally adequate 
education for all of their students. In certain states, this may 
require the retooling of the whole educational system including 
its finance, goals, and accountability measures. This process 
has proven to be difficult to implement, as demonstrated by 
protracted litigation in states such as New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, and TexasJ6 
Most commentary has acknowledged 1989 as the beginning 
of the adequacy movement, and identified an adequacy lawsuit, 
at least initially, by the plaintiffs' exclusive focus on a state's 
education clause violation without an accompanying equal 
protection argument. However, plaintiffs, both before and after 
this date, have brought equal protection claims in addition to 
their education clause claims in their educational finance 
lawsuits. Therefore, this article considers a court decision an 
adequacy case if (1) the plaintiffs argued a state duty to provide 
an adequate education under the education clause of the state 
constitution, (2) the court agreed that there was a duty, and (3) 
the court found a possible or actual violation of that duty. 
Thus, the adequacy cases discussed here include a few 
decisions before 1989 and some after that date that might not 
traditionally be considered adequacy cases but that do include 
the basic educational theory promoted by the adequacy 
movement. 17 
III. THE COURTS' CONCEPTIONS OF ADEQUACY 
Adequacy lawsuits are a response in general to the wide 
differences in the quality of education that is provided to 
students throughout a given state and in particular to the poor 
quality education that certain students receive. Because 
education is at least partly funded through local sources in 
most states, 18 children who reside in districts with a lower 
16. See Appendix 1 for a list. of cases. 
17. These cases include decisions from Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South 
Carolina, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Appendix 1 for a list of 
cases. 
18. MAKING MONEY MATTER: FINANCING AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 53 (Helen F. Ladd & 
Janet. S. Hansen eds., 1999). 
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ability to raise education revenues receive a lower quality of 
education than children living in districts that are able to raise 
more funds to devote to education. 19 These poorer districts, 
adequacy proponents contend, are not financially able to 
provide students with an adequate education. Adequacy 
proponents desire to enforce the state's responsibility to offer a 
basic quality education to all students regardless of where they 
reside within the state. 
The foundation of the educational adequacy argument is 
the idea that the individual state constitutions require the 
state government to establish, maintain, and sufficiently fund 
a quality public education system so that students can meet 
specific educational outcomes or standards. This duty is a 
constitutional priority that must be fulfilled by the state and 
cannot be subject to local differences that undermine the 
quality of the education provided. After a court identifies that a 
duty to educate exists, it must define the state's responsibilities 
under this duty. This is often done in reference to educational 
standards or goals that are created either by the court, the 
state legislature, or the state education agency. Once these 
obligations are articulated, the court must determine whether 
they are being fulfilled. At this stage, evidence of the condition 
of the state's school buildings, the quality of its staff, and the 
state of its educational programs is considered. If the education 
provided is insufficient to attain the state's standards and 
goals, the court finds a constitutional violation and orders the 
state to improve its educational programs in order to perform 
its responsibility to educate its youth. 
A. The State Constitutional Duty to Provide a Public Education 
In an adequacy lawsuit, the court is asked to interpret its 
state constitution's education clause to identify and enforce the 
state's duty to establish and maintain its public education 
system at the constitutionally required level of financial and 
academic sufficiency. Almost every state constitution requires 
its government to institute and sustain a system of public 
19. Sec, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 
552 (Mass. 1993): see also Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 6R4, 
690 (Mont. 1989) (discussing the conclusion that spending disparities between school 
districts means unequal educational opportunities). 
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schools. 20 Yet each state constitution is unique, so the specific 
language used to create and describe the government's 
obligation for public education must be examined in light of the 
st~te's legal and political history to determine whether a duty 
exists for the state to provide an education to its populace and, 
if so, what this duty entails. 
The adequacy courts begin their analysis by examining the 
basic pronouncements on public schooling in their respective 
state constitutions to determine the components of the state's 
duty. At their most basic level, the state constitutions require 
that the government "establish and maintain" a public 
education system. Beyond the provision of and support for 
public education, adequacy courts must identify the level of 
quality that this system must exhibit. 
To identify a level of quality, most courts rely on the 
constitutional language that describes the schools the state 
must furnish. Initial legal scholars on this topic suggested that 
this descriptive or "quality" component of the state's education 
clause could be used as a predictor to determine whether an 
adequacy lawsuit was likely to succeed because the language 
could be organized into categories according to its strength. 21 
20. Requirements for supporting public school systems are found in the following 
state constitutions: ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. 
art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, ~ 
1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. 
Cm\IST. art. VIII, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6(b); KY. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1:3(B); ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. 
pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; Mo. 
CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONS'!'. art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. 
art. XI, §§ 1-2; N.H. CONS'!'. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII; N.J. CONS'!'. art. VIII, § 4, ~ 1; N.M. 
CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1); N.D. CONST. 
art. VIII,§§ 1-4; OHIO CONST. art. VI,§ 2; OR. CONST. art. VIII,§ 3; FA. CONST. art. III, 
§ 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. ANN. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; 
TENN. CONST. art. XI, §12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. 
CONST. § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII,§ 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX,§§ 1-2; W.VA. CONST. art. 
XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. I, §23 and art. VII, § 1. The following 
state constitutions permissively allow state legislatures to support public school 
systems: ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; W. VA. CONST. art. 
XII, § 1. Iowa's constitution is the only state constitution to make no provisions for 
educational responsibilities. 
21. William Thro has categorized the state education clauses language into three 
different groups that reflect the quality requin~ment contained within. At the low end 
of the spectrum are the "establishment provisions" that require the state to maintain a 
system of public schools. In the middle are the ''quality provisions" that include a 
quality qualifier for the educational system. At the high end of the spectrum are the 
"high duty provisions" that make education a priority among other government 
290 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2007 
Yet, not all states have quality language in addition to the 
"establish and maintain" clause, and no correlation has been 
shown between the purported quality language in the 
constitution and the likelihood of success in an adequacy 
lawsuit. In practice, adequacy lawsuits have been successful 
across the quality spectrum. The constitutional language in the 
successful adequacy cases range from a state with an education 
clause that mandates only that a public school system be 
"established and maintained,"22 to two states in which the 
interests of education must be "cherished."23 
The wide range of language used in state constitutions to 
describe the state's duty with respect to education is 
represented below. The constitutional language in the 
successful adequacy lawsuits describes either the quality of the 
educational system to be provided or the system's purpose as 
follows: 
free- New York, South Carolina,24 
liberal- Alabama, 25 
uniform- New Mexico, North Dakota,26 
general and uniform - Arizona, Minnesota, North Carolina, 
Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, 27 
complete and uniform - Wyoming, 28 
general, uniform, and thorough - Idaho, 29 
as nearly uniform as practicable - Wisconsin, 30 
services. Thro, supra note 8, at 539-40 (referring generally to classifications used by 
Erica B. Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 66--70 (1974); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for 
Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 814-16, 
n.143-46 (1985)). 
22. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
23. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII. 
24. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
25. ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256. The current version of this constitutional section 
no longer includes this language. 
26. N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
27. ARIZ. CoNST. art. XI, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 
2(1); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
28. WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
29. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
30. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3. 
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efficient- Texas, Kentucky, 3l 
general, suitable and efficient- Arkansas,32 and 
thorough and efficient - Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, West 
Virginia, Wyoming,33 
guarantee equality of educational opportunity to all -
Montana,34 
make suitable prov1s10n for the finance of the educational 
interests - Kansas, 35 and 
cherish the interests of literature and the sciences 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire. 36 
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No clear pattern emerges from examining these provisions. 
The adequacy courts have found a basic quality requirement 
that was not being met even when the state is only required to 
provide a free or no cost education, 37 an efficient education, 38 
and when it must cherish the interests of literature and the 
sciences. 39 In essence, these courts have held that whenever a 
state is required to establish and maintain a public education 
system, regardless of the particular language used to describe 
it, it must meet basic quality standards. 
In the unsuccessful adequacy lawsuits, the specific 
language of the state education clauses has not been 
determinative of the case outcome. Instead, the courts have 
focused on separation of powers issues and rejected the 
adequacy proponents' request for the court to define what 
constitutes an adequate education or adequate funding 
because, in the courts' view, this determination is a 
responsibility of the state legislature.40 The courts that have 
31. KY. CONST. § 183; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
32. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
33. MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, ~ 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, 
§ 2; W.VA. CONST. art. XII,§ 1; WYO. CONST. art. VII,§ 9. 
34. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1). 
35. KAN. CONS'!'. art. VI, § 6(b). 
36. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII. 
37. See, e.g., Abeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999). 
38. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989). 
39. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 
553-54 (Mass. 1993). 
40. Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 407-08 (Fla. 1996); 
Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1193 (Ill. 1996); Charlet v. State, 
713 So. 2d 1199, 1206 (La. 1998); Marerro v. Pennsylvania, 709 A.2d 956, 965-66 (Pa. 
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declined to pass judgment on their state educational system on 
adequacy grounds have dealt with constitutional language that 
is very similar to the language addressed by the adequacy 
courts. These states have education clauses that require the 
government to do the following: 
make adequate provision for a uniform system of public 
schools- Florida, 41 
provide an efficient system of high quality public educational 
institutions and services- Illinois, 42 
provide a minimum foundation of education in all public 
elementary and secondary schools - Louisiana, 43 
provide for a thorough and efficient system of public 
education- Pennsyluania,44 and 
secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of 
education- Rhode Island. 45 
There is no appreciable difference between these underlying 
constitutional provisions and those interpreted by the courts in 
adequacy lawsuits that were successful. In fact, the 
constitutional language to support the argument for providing 
a quality education seems stronger in these states than in 
many of those where adequacy lawsuits have been successful. 
But these courts have avoided a determination of quality by 
focusing on the separation of powers issue. 
In sum, numerous courts have found a duty to provide an 
adequate education to the children of their state based on the 
education provisions in their state constitutions. This duty has 
been established across the spectrum of the strength of the 
quality language that describes the state's responsibility 
toward public schooling. Yet a few state courts have declined to 
step into the educational adequacy arena, perceiving it as an 
interference with the state legislature's role to provide for 
public education in the state. 
---- --- ·-------~--- --- ----
1997); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57-59 (R.I. 199fi). 
41. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see Coal. for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 405. Since this 
decision, the Florida Constitution has been revised to include even stronger language 
regarding the State's responsibility for education. 
42. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; Ed{?ar, 672 N.E.2d at 118:3. 
43. LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13B; Charlet, 71:l So. 2d at 120::l. 
44. PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; Marerro, 709 A.2d 956, 958. 
45. R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 49--50. 
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B. Evidence of an Inadequate Education 
Plaintiffs have brought lawsuits that highlight the 
inadequacies in the current systems by detailing problems with 
the objects of education: the resources/inputs available in the 
schools and/or the results/outputs of education. The financial 
inputs of education are the items that figured prominently in 
the previous equity lawsuits of the first and second waves. 
Adequacy cases are sometimes characterized by their reliance 
on an output rather than input analysis as a basis for finding 
inadequacy of educational effort. The concept of adequacy, as 
one that strives to provide a high minimum quality of 
education to all students, would seem to naturally focus the 
inquiry into the sufficiency of the state's educational effort by 
examining the accomplishments of its students - the most 
frequently used output measure. Yet the adequacy courts have 
continued to place a heavy emphasis on educational input 
measures. 
The quality of education supplied though these inputs and 
outputs is contrasted with a statement of what students should 
learn through their education, the education provided by other, 
usually wealthier, districts in the state, and/or with 
surrounding states that supply their students with quality 
facilities, staff, equipment, supplies, and course offerings. If the 
quality of the inputs and outputs within the districts in 
question are significantly lower than that in the comparison 
set, an inadequate education is being provided. 
On the input side, courts have found the following elements 
relevant to the inquiry: insufficient numbers of trained 
teachers, 46 large class size and high student-teacher ratios,47 
shortages of school staff, 48 inadequate educational supplies, 49 
46. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.:id 472, 489 (Ark. 
2002); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.K2d 516, 553 (Mass. 
199:3); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campai{?n Ill), HOI N.K2d :126, :3:33 (N.Y. 
2003); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph 1), 677 N.E.2d 7:3:1, 745 (Ohio 1997). 
4 7. Opinion of the ,Justices No. 3:38 (Opinion), 624 So. 2d 107, 1:33 (Ala. 1993) 
(quoting from lower court decision, which is included as an appendix to this opinion); 
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d 
at 553; Campaign III, SOl N.E.2d at 335; DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 744; Campbell 
County Sch. Dist. v. State. 907 1'.2d 12:38. 1253 (Wyo. 1995). 
48. Opinion, 624 So. 2d at Li:i; DeRolph I , 677 N.E.2d at 761 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
49. See, e.g., Opinion, 624 So. 2d at 1:31-:32; Lake View, 91 S.W.:3d at 489-90; 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign II), 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 51:i (App. Div. 
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scarce equipment,50 limited course offerings,51 inadequate 
curricula or teaching of basic subjects, 52 school buildings that 
are overcrowded, in disrepair, or lack basic necessary 
components,53 schools that do not meet accreditation 
standards, 54 disparities in amounts of money spent per 
students among different districts within the state, 55 
disproportionate tax burdens among districts within the 
state, 56 and significantly lower amounts spent on education 
than in other states. 57 
In fact, the Ohio Supreme Court based its 1997 adequacy 
decision on overwhelming evidence of insufficient educational 
inputs, saying that "many districts are 'starved for funds,' and 
lack teachers, buildings, or equipment. These school districts, 
plagued with deteriorating buildings, insufficient supplies, 
inadequate curricula and technology, and large student-teacher 
ratios, desperately lack the resources necessary to provide 
students with a minimally adequate education."58 
Output measures that have been used by the courts as a 
basis for finding the quality of the education provided 
inadequate include low standardized test scores, 59 high 
~-~-~~---~--------------
2001); DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 744. 
50. Opinion, 624 So. 2d at 134; Lake View, 91 S.W.3d at 489~90; Campaign II, 
719 N.Y.S.2d at 514; DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 742. 
51. See, e.g., Opinion, 624 So. 2d at 131~32; Lake View, 91 S.W.3d at 490; Rose, 
790 S.W.2d at 197; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 553; Campaign II, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 500~01 
(discussing the defunding of art and physical education and the important role these 
courses play in "supporting a sound basic education"). 
52. Opinion, 624 So. 2d at 121~22; see also Kasayulie v. State, No. 3AN-97-3782 
CIV (Alaska Super. Ct. 1999); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 
P.2d 806, 808 (Ariz. 1994); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 553. 
53. See Columbia Falls Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.::ld 257, 26::3 (Mont. 2005); 
Campaign II, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 500~08; DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 742; Campbell County 
Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1255 (Wyo. 1995). 
54. Opinion, 624 So. 2d at 127~28. 
55. Id. at 116; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 199; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 552; Helena 
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 686 (Mont. 1989); Abbott v. Burke 
(Abbott II), 575 A.2d ::359, 374 (N.J. 1990); Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 
S.E.2d 365, 373 (N.C. 2004); DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 758~59; Edgewood lndep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989). 
56. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1356 (N.H. 
1997); DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 745~46; Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 393. 
57. Opinion, 624 So. 2d at 138; Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 
S.W.3d 472, 488 (Ark. 2002). 
58. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 745. 
59. See, e.g., Lake View, 91 S.W.3d at 488-89; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197; Bradford 
v. Md. State Bd. of Educ., Case No. 95258055/CL20251, slip op. at •n 101~105 (Bait 
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dropout rates among high school students,60 low graduation 
rates,61 high college remediation rates,62 and insufficient 
preparation for the workforce.63 For example, in a 2004 
decision, North Carolina's Supreme Court found that 
"an inordinate number of Hoke County students ha[d] 
consistently failed to match the academic performance of their 
statewide public school counterparts and that such failure, 
measured by their [academic] performance ... , their dropout 
rates, their graduation rates, their need for remedial help, 
their inability to compete in the job markets, and their 
inability to compete in collegiate ranks [constituted a] clear 
showing that they ha[d] failed to obtain a Leandro-comporting 
education."64 
Thus, courts have considered the quality of both the 
outcomes of education such as student test scores and 
graduation rates along with the more traditional concern for 
the inputs of education that include money, supplies, 
equipment, curricula, buildings, and staff when making their 
determinations about the suitability of the state's educational 
efforts. 
IV. THE COMPONENTS OF AN ADEQUATE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
The three components of educational adequacy that have 
been addressed by the courts are funding, goals, and 
accountability. The intent of the proponents of the adequacy 
lawsuits is to find the current level of state funding for 
education and the quality of education provided 
City Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 2004) (stating that Baltimore City student performance is not up 
to par with state requirements, or state averages, "at every grade level and on every 
test"); Hoke, 599 S.E.2d at 383; Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign II[), 
801 N.E.2d 326, 339-40 (N.Y. 2003). But see Columbia Falls v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 263 
(Mont. 2005) (holding that good student performance on standardized achievement 
tests are not the only measurement of a quality education system). 
60. Opinion, 624 So. 2d at 136-37; Bradford, Case No. 95258055/CL20251, slip 
op. at~~ 113-114; Hoke, 599 S.E.2d at 384. 
61. Lake View, 91 S.W.3d at 488; Bradford, Case No. 95258055/CL20251, slip op. 
at~ 115; Hoke, 599 S.E.2d at 384; Campaign III, 801 N.E.2d at 336-37. 
62. Opinion, 624 So. 2d at 137; Lake View, 91 S.W.3d at 488; Hoke, 599 S.E.2d at 
385. 
63. Hoke, 599 S.E.2d at 384. 
64. ld. at 386. Leandro is the previous North Carolina court decision that found 
the educational system to be inadequate. See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 
1997). 
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constitutionally insufficient. To do this, many courts have 
defined the goals of a constitutionally adequate education, (i.e. 
the qualities, skills, and characteristics a child would need to 
effectively function in society today), as a way of measuring the 
sufficiency of the funding and the educational program. In 
addition, a few courts have acknowledged that just having 
funding and standards is not enough to guarantee the desired 
results; a system to hold schools accountable for accomplishing 
the learning is also needed. 65 
A. Funding 
At the core of the adequacy lawsuits is their challenge to 
the existing state school finance systems. A foundational 
principle in adequacy cases is that there is a causal link 
between the amount of money spent on education and the 
educational opportunity offered to the students. One court 
noted, "[I]ncreased educational resources, if properly deployed, 
can have a significant and lasting effect on student 
performance."66 
The adequacy decisions clarify the states' responsibility for 
funding their public school systems. They declare that it is a 
state, not a local, duty to adequately fund the schools in light of 
the state constitution's requirement that its government 
establish and maintain the public education system.67 Because 
of the constitutional stature of the duty to educate, a few courts 
have declared it to be the state's first funding priority over the 
provision of all other government services. 68 In addition, some 
65. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont IV), 794 A.2d 744, 751 (N.H. 
2002). 
66. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign 11), 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 525 
(App. Div. 2001); see also Opinion, 624 So. 2d at 140-41; Lake View, 91 S.W.:3d at 498; 
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 198 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec'y of 
the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 552 (Mass. 1993); Abbott v. Burke, 575 
A.2d 359, 363 (N .• J. 1990) ("Money can make a difference if effectively used, it can 
provide students with an equal educational opportunity, a chance to succeed."); cf. 
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (EdfJewood 1), 777 S.W.2d :391, :393 (Tex. 1989) 
("The amount of money spent on a student's education has a real and meaningful 
impact on the educational opportunity offered that student."). 
67. See Opinion, 624 So. 2d at 146; Lake View v. Huckabee, No. 1992-5:318, slip 
op. at§ III,~ 49 (Ark. Ch. Ct. May 25, 2001); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. 
Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 813 (Ariz. 1994); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 205; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d 
at 548; Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 11), 703 A.2d 1:353, 1:356 (N.H. 
1997); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph 1), 677 N.E.2d 7:33,745 (Ohio 1997). 
68. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91 
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courts have held education funding cannot be reliant on local 
capacity to fund. 69 The revenue sources must be dependable, 
not derived from discretionary levies or taxes that voters can 
choose not to enact. 70 A number of states do allow for local 
revenues to be part of the basic funding for an adequate 
education, 71 but their reliance on local funding sources cannot 
be the cause of the disparities among districts in the state 72 or 
be based on unreasonable and inequitable tax burdens. 73 
At its essence, educational adequacy requires each district 
within the state to have enough money to offer its students a 
basic quality education. This is an absolute level of sufficiency 
rather than a relative standard like that traditionally 
associated with the educational finance equity cases of the 
past, which centered on comparing spending across districts. 
The level of funding provided by the state must be enough in 
every district to afford the substantive level of education that is 
mandated by the state constitution.74 To establish this 
standard, the courts have called for sufficient educational 
financial support to do the following: 
to provide an adequate education,75 
to meet the constitutional mandate,76 
to provide basic education, 77 
(Wash. 1978); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995). 
69. See, e.g., Rose. 790 S.W.2d at 211; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555 (Mass. 1993); 
Campbell. 907 P.2d at 1274; DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 745, 747. 
70. Seattle, 585 P.2d at 97. 
71. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1360; Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 292 (N.J. 
1973); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 256 (N.C. 1997); Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 7:30 (Tex. 1995), modified opinion of Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 89:3 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1995). 
72. Lake View, No. 1992-5318, slip op. at § III, ~ 49; Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 815; 
DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993, 1013 (Ohio 2000). 
73. Claremont II, 70:3 A.2d at 1360. 
74. See Opinion of the .Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 165-66 (Ala. 1993); see 
generally Pinto v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894 (Ala. 1995); Montoy v. State 
(Montoy II), 102 P.3d 1160, 1164 (Kan. 2005); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213; Abbott v. Burke 
(Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 368 (N.J. 1990); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State 
(Campaign I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 1995); Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717, 730-31. 
75. Rose. 790 S.W.2d at 21:3. 
76. McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 556 (Mass. 
1993). 
77. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978). 
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to provide equal access to a sound basic education, 78 
to offer "the opportunity for a sound basic education" in every 
school, 79 and 
to ensure enough money so that students have a chance to 
succeed because of the educational opportunity provided, not 
in spite of it. 80 
In this manner, adequacy requires the state governments to 
furnish the money for a basic quality education in all of the 
districts throughout the state. 
The sufficiency of a state's school funding can be defined (1) 
by its provision of educational inputs as one in which "each and 
every school district in the state has an ample number of 
teachers, sound buildings ... , and equipment sufficient for all 
students to be afforded an educational opportunity,"81 or (2) by 
the system's outputs as one in which the "amount of revenue 
per pupil enable[s] a student to acquire knowledge and skills 
necessary to participate productively in society .... "82 
Adequacy requires the state to provide equality of 
educational opportunity to each student to achieve the 
constitutionally mandated level of education. It does not 
require strict horizontal equity so that each child within the 
state will have the same amount of money spent on his or her 
education. 83 Vertical equity funding disparities are allowed by 
several adequacy courts to compensate for differences in 
regional costs and student needs that translate into higher 
costs to supply the same quality of education throughout the 
state. 84 Numerous courts also allow for local communities to 
78. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 256 (N.C. 1997). 
79. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign III), 801 N.E.2d :~26, 348 
(N.Y. 2003). 
80. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 746 (Ohio 1997). 
81. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Ohio 2000). 
82. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, No. 1992-5~H8, slip op. at § III, ,I 4 7 
(Ark. Ch. Ct. May 25, 2001). 
83. Roosevelt v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 814 (Ariz. 1994); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 
359, 369 (N.J. 1990); DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 746; Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989). 
84. Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 115 (Ala. 1993); Montoy v. 
State (Montoy II), 102 P.3d 1160, 1164-65 (Kan. 2005); Bradford v. Md. State Bd. of 
Educ., Case No. 95258055/CL20251, slip op. at ~ 38--39 (Balt. City Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 
2004); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297-98 (N.J. 1973); Abbott, 575 A.2d at 375; 
see also Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign II), 719 N.Y.S.2d 4 75, 517 
(App. Div. 2001) (stating that while the State is required only to "provide the 
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supplement the basic quality education required by the state 
constitution to provide for a better-than-adequate education.85 
Even though these adjustments and supplements will result in 
unequal revenues across districts, the courts that allow them 
have found that they are consistent with the state's 
constitutional duties to provide its citizens with an adequate 
education. 
Looking at the twenty-one adequacy court decisions 
represented in the table below,86 a total of thirteen states87 
specifically allow for variance in funding among districts. Three 
of these provide for regional and student population cost 
differences, 88 five states permit localities to supplement state 
established mm1mum district funding levels, 89 and the 
remammg five states sanction both types of funding 
variations. 90 
opportunity for a sound basic education," that opportunity "must be placed within 
reach of all students," and the State is not relieved of its constitutional obligations 
"when public school students present with socio-economic deficits"); Campaign Ill, 801 
N.E.2d at 348; Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 398; Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 
907 P.2d 1238, 1278-79 (Wyo. 1995). 
85. Lake View, No. 1992-5318, slip op. at § III, 'lJ 125; Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 815; 
Montoy v. State, 112 P.:1d 923, 9.'37 (Kan. 2005) supplemental opinion of Montoy II, 102 
P.3d 1160 (Kan. 2005); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211-12 (Ky. 
1989); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1274 (Wyo. 1995); 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I[), 703 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997); 
Robinson, 303 A.2d at 298; Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 256 (N.C. 1997); DeRolph 
I, 677 N.E.2d at 746; Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 398. 
86. This table categorizes states based on a specific reference to the relevant issue 
within a court's decision. Other states may permit supplemental educational revenues 
or adjustments within the context of adequacy, but it is not specifically mentioned 
within a court decision. 
87. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and Wyoming. 
88. Alabama, Maryland, and New York. 
89. Arkansas, Kentucky, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Ohio. 
90. Arizona, Kansas, New Jersey, Texas and Wyoming. 
300 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2007 
Vertical Localities Can Supplement $ 
Equity 
*Alabama Yes 
*Alaska 
Arizona Yes Yes 
*Arkansas Yes 
Idaho 
Kansas Yes Yes 
Kentucky Yes 
Maryland Yes 
Massachu-
setts 
Montana No 
New Yes 
Hampshire 
New Jersey Yes Yes 
New Mexico 
New York Yes 
North Yes 
Carolina 
Ohio Yes 
South 
Carolina 
Texas Yes Yes 
Washington 
*West 
Virginia 
*Wyoming Yes Yes 
* Denotes Court decisions that are based in part on state 
equal protection clauses.91 
To accomplish the funding of an adequate education, most 
states begin with an equalization of revenues concept, similar 
to that promoted by horizontal equity. Adequate educational 
funding promotes this revenue equalizing principle by: 
91. See Appendix 1 for case names. 
2] 
eliminating 
Montana, 93 
offerings 
districts, 
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large disparities in funding - Kentucky, 92 
New Jersey,94 and Texas, 95 or in educational 
Kentucky96 between richer and poorer school 
providing substantially equal educational revenues to rich 
and poor districts - New Jersey97 and Texas, 98 
assuring comparable funding to every school district - New 
Hampshire, 99 
funding in an equitable manner- Montana, lOO 
distributing funds equitably and evenly- Texas, 101 and 
supplying "sufficient funds to educate children on 
substantially equal terms"- Arizona. 102 
301 
Once a base level of funding is determined, courts in eight 
states provide for the adjustment of educational revenues to 
account for differences in the cost of educating students in 
specific regions or groupings. 103 The Kansas Supreme Court 
calls for a financing formula with equitable distribution 
relative to the actual costs of education.l04 Similarly, the 
Arkansas County Chancery Court explained that the dollar 
amount that is "adequate" is a function of many variables, 
including the purchasing power of a dollar in a given locality, 
characteristics of students, and other factors such as 
population sparsity and school size.105 
92. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989). 
9:3. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 61l4. 690 (Mont. 191l9). 
94. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott[), 495 A.2d ::376, :iSS (N .• J. 19S5). 
95. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Eduewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391, :l97-9S 
(Tex. 1989). 
96. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 198, 213. 
97. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 11), 575 A.2d ::359, 408 (N.J. 1990). 
98. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397. 
99. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont If), 70::3 A.2d 1::35::3, 1360 (N.H. 
1997). 
100. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989). 
101. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 398. 
102. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, R14 (Ariz. 
1994). 
10:1. Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and 
Wyoming. 
104. Montoy v. State, 112 P.:ld 923, 9:H-39 (Kan. 200f>), supplemental opinion of 
Montoy v. State (Montoy 1[), 102 P.:3d 1160 (Kan. 2005). 
105. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, No. 1992-f>:=l18, slip op. at§ III, ,I 4 7 
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Finally, a total of ten adequacy courts allow for the 
supplementation of educational revenues by localities. 106 The 
Kansas Supreme Court explained that once the legislature has 
provided suitable funding for the state school system, there 
may be nothing in the constitution that prevents the 
legislature from allowing school districts to raise additional 
funds for enhancements to the constitutionally adequate 
education already provided.107 
Adequacy can be characterized as requiring substantial 
equality of educational funding throughout the state at a level 
that permits a basic quality education to be supplied. 108 It 
generally does not obligate a state to supply equal amounts of 
financial resources to each district. Instead, it calls for a basic 
level of funding necessary to provide the required level of 
educational quality. This amount can be supplemented based 
on regional and student group cost differences and local 
revenue enhancement. 
B. The States' Teaching Responsibilities- Education Goa[sl09 
Courts that have been asked to consider adequacy 
challenges interpret their state constitutions' education clause 
to determine whether a duty to educate exists and what it 
entails. Of the state courts that have addressed the issue, 
ultimately all of the courts have found a governmental 
obligation to educate the children within the state. The courts 
stipulate that children be given the following types of 
education: 
(Ark. Ch. Ct. May 25. 2001). 
106. Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New ,Jersey, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and Wyoming. 
107. Montoy, 112 P.3d at 937. 
108. But see Leandro u. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 256~57 (N.C. 1997), in which the 
court rejects this particular wording when it calls for equal access to a sound basic 
education but not substantially equal funding or educational advantages in every 
district. This court allows for local supplementation and discusses the impracticality of 
attempting to equalize funding or educational advantages across the state. I d. at 256~ 
57. 
109. This discussion is limited to the education goals created and adopted by the 
courts. Other educational goals that were developed by the state legislature or 
department of education are not included here. 
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adequate education - Arkansas, 110 Kansas, 111 Kentucky, 112 
Maryland, 113 Massachusetts, 114 New Hampshire, 115 and 
Ohio, 116 
a minimally adequate education - Alabama, 117 New York, 118 
and South Carolina, l19 
a basic education- Washington, 120 
a sound basic education - New York, 121 and North 
Carolina, 122 
a quality education Alabama, 123 Montana, 124 and 
Wyoming, 125 
a proper education- Wyoming, 126 
a suitable education- Kansas, 127 
a high quality education- West Virginia, 128 or 
a thorough and efficient education- New Jersey.129 
110. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 492 (Ark. 2002). 
111. See Montoy, 112 P.3d at 937. 
112. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989). 
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113. Bradford v. Md. State Bd. of Educ., Case No. 95258055/CL20251, slip op. at~ 
57 (Bait. City Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 2004). 
114. McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 519 n.8 
(Mass. 1993). In this case the court uses the term "adequate" but thinks it is redundant 
with the term "education." 
115. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 
1993). 
116. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 745 (Ohio 1997). 
117. Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 154 (Ala. 1993). 
118. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign II), 719 N.Y.S.2d 4 75, 520 
(App. Div. 2001). 
119. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999). 
120. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978). 
121. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 665 (N.Y. 
1995). 
122. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (NC 1997). 
123. Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 154 (Ala. 1993). 
124. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 689 (Mont. 1989). 
125. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1258 (Wyo. 1995). 
126. Id. at 1259. 
127. Montoy v. State (Montoy II), 102 P.3d 1160, 1164 (Kan. 2005). 
128. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W.Va. 1979). 
129. New Jersey- all Robinson and Abbott decisions. See Appendix 1. 
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Although the manner in which the required education is 
described differs, ultimately, all of the courts call for schools 
that meet educational standards and accomplish their 
educational goals. As one court explained, the state has a "duty 
to ensure that the public schools achieve their object and 
educate the people."1:30 
The courts use similar language to describe the level of 
access to education required by the states' constitutions. The 
basic requirement is that the state must educate all children181 
and that each child must have a chance to succeed because of 
the educational opportunity provided by the state, not in spite 
of it. 1:32 To describe the level of educational opportunity that 
the states need to offer, the courts stipulate that each child be 
giVen: 
an opportunity- New York, 188 North Carolina, 184 and South 
Carolina, 185 
the same opportunity and access- Kentucky, 186 
a substantially equal or equitable opportunity - Alabama, 187 
or 
an equal opportunity Arkansas, 188 Kentucky, 189 
Montana, 140 New Jersey, 141 and Wyoming. 142 
130. McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 526 (Mass. 
1993). 
1 :n. I d. at 553. 
132. DeRolph v. State (DcRolph 1), 677 N.E.2d 733, 746 (Ohio 1997). 
133. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign 1), 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 
1995). 
1:34. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997). 
135. Sec Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 541 (S.C. 1999). 
136. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989). 
137. Pinto v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894, 896 (Ala. 1995). 
138. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 492 (Ark. 2002). 
139. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. 
140. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 689-90 (Mont. 
1989). 
141. Sec Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) (holding that the state 
has an "obligation to afford all pupils that level of instructional opportunity which is 
comprehended by a thorough and efficient system of education ... "). 
142. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 12:ltl, 1266 (Wyo. 1995). This 
language is typically thought of in reference to the equal protection clause of the state 
constitutions. Alabama, Arkansas, West Virginia, and Wyoming are states in which the 
courts specifically found state equal protection clause violations in addition to an 
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However the courts describe it, this opportunity is the right 
of all children to have access to an adequate education. It 
encompasses the basic components of education - including 
teachers, 143 curricula, 144 facilities, 145 and instruments of 
learning146- so that children living in all areas of the state, 
regardless of the wealth of the communities within which they 
live or their own personal economic circumstances, are 
presented with the opportunity to acquire the essential 
competencies that equate to an adequate education, 147 thereby 
allowing them to achieve basic educational equality with their 
more advantaged peers. 148 
Access to education does not mean, however, that each 
district will have equality in educational resources or 
financing. The North Carolina Supreme Court explained that 
although access to an adequate education must be provided 
equally in every school district, the constitution does not 
require substantially equal educational programs in all school 
districts. In some instances, the playing field must be leveled 
by providing poorer districts with more money. In others, the 
educational opportunities in a community will be supplemented 
beyond the level of an adequate education through voluntary 
local funding. Thus, the term "substantial equality" most 
accurately describes the level of educational opportunities 
required by the adequacy courts. 149 The substantial equality of 
opportunity is found in the state's provision of an adequate 
education article or adequacy violation. Therefore, it is not surprising that all of these 
states use a variation of the equal opportunity language to specify the type of access to 
education required. Montana's education clause specifically requires equal educational 
opportunity. The New Jersey plaintiffs brought an equal protection clause challenge, 
but the courts decided only on education clause grounds. 
143. Helena, 769 P.2d at 691. Although the court chose not to address specific 
elements that constitute an "equal educational opportunity," it did name teachers as 
one of the "additional factors" that are a "significant part of the education of each 
person in Montana." Id.; see also Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign 1), 
655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995). 
144. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 500 (Ark. 2002); 
Campaign I, 655 N.E.2d at 666. 
145. Lake View, !11 S.W.:-ld at 500; Campaign I, 655 N.E.2d at 666. 
146. Lake View, 91 S.W.3d at 500; Campaign I, 655 N.E.2d at 666. 
147. Pinto v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894, 896 (Ala. 1995); Rose v. Council 
for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989). 
148. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990). 
149. But see Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 256-57 (N.C. 1997) (stating that so 
much variation cannot be considered "substantial equality"). 
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education within the reach of all students150 within the state 
while inequality in the amount actually spent on the education 
and the supplemental programs offered may vary from district 
to district. 
1. What this duty entails - expectations for student 
performance 
While it is clear that states have a duty to provide an 
education to their children, the parameters of what this 
education encompasses are not immediately obvious. The 
training of students through education may be understood in 
its totality as comprising: 
all that series of instruction and discipline which is intended 
to enlighten the understanding, correct the temper, and form 
the manners and habits of youth, and fit them for usefulness 
in the future. In its most extended signification it may be 
defined, in reference to man, to be the act of developing and 
cultivating the various physical, intellectual, aesthetic and 
moral faculties. 151 
Translating this broad definition into practice, the courts 
have identified three general roles that public education is 
intended to prepare students to perform in society. Schools 
should develop the intellectual, emotional, and moral 
capabilities of students as individuals, workers, and 
participants in our political system. As one court noted, "The 
State's constitutional duty . . . embraces broad educational 
opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip our 
children for their role as citizens and as potential competitors 
in today's market as well as in the marketplace of ideas."152 
a) Role as citizens/individuals- intellectual pursuits 
Alabama, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Texas, Washington, West Virginia 
As one of its primary goals, education should prepare 
children to function as individual adults who possess a basic 
understanding of the world, who are capable and self-aware, 
150. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign I[), 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 517 
(App. Div. 2001). 
151. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978). 
152. Id. 
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and who interact with others in a complex and rapidly 
changing society. 
Many courts have indicated that a basic understanding of 
our complex society should be promoted in the public schools by 
teaching what has traditionally been seen as the academic 
subjects. 153 This includes a foundational knowledge of the 
fields of mathematics, 154 physical science, 155 and language 
arts. 156 It also encompasses an awareness of and ability to 
appreciate music, 157 visual art, 158 performance art, 159and 
literature. 160 
In addition to this basic academic knowledge, some courts 
have directed the schools to educate the whole person, focusing 
not only their minds, but also their bodies and their emotions. 
Promoting knowledge of oneself161 and understanding of one's 
physical and mental health 162 is an important component of a 
child's education. In addition, every student should receive 
support and guidance so he or she feels a sense of self-worth, 
an ability to achieve, and encouragement to live up to his or 
her full human potential. 163 Moreover, courts call for students 
153. Of course these subjects are also important to train students who are 
participants in our government and economy. 
154. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign[), 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 
1995); Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255; Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 
535, 540 (S.C. 1999). 
155. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255; Abbeville, 515 S.E.2d at 540. 
156. See Campaign I, 655 N.E.2d at 666 (N.Y. 1995) ("Children are also entitled 
to ... reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing .... "); Leandro, 
488 S.E.2d at 255; see also Abbeville, 515 S.E.2d at 540 (stating that the abilities of 
reading, writing, and speaking English should also be taught). 
157. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I[), 575 A.2d 359, 397 (N.J. 1990); Pauley v. 
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W.Va. 1979). 
158. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. 
Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Abbott II, 575 
A.2d at 364; Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I[), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 
(N.H. 1997); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign I[), 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 500 
(App. Div. 2001); Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877 (W.Va. 1979). 
159. Campaign II, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 500-01; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877. 
160. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 397; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877. 
161. Pinto v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894, 896 (Ala. 1995); Rose, 790 
S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359; Pauley, 
255 S.E.2d at 877. 
162. Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 
554; Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 
(Wash. 1978); see also Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877 (defining education as "the 
development of mind, body and social morality ... "). 
163. Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896. 
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to interact with others in society. To facilitate compatibility 
with others, students should learn oral and written 
communications skills164 and social ethics or morality. 165 
To this end, courts envision future adult citizens who are 
equipped to fully participate in the life of their community and 
society. 166 With their academic foundation, self-knowledge, and 
interactive skills, these adults will be able to inquire, study, 
evaluate, and gain maturity and understanding, 167 to function 
at the state, national, and international levels, 168 to appreciate 
their cultural and historical heritage, 169 and the cultural 
heritage of others, 170 to share their ideas with others, 171 and to 
exercise their First Amendment freedoms. 172 They will also be 
capable of monitoring and contributing to their own physical 
and mental well-being. 173 If successful, the state will have 
cultivated the intellectual, aesthetic, and moral faculties of 
each individual child.174 
b) Competitors in the market- career pursuits 
Alabama, New York, South Carolina, West Virginia 
The adequacy courts have identified preparation of 
students to compete for and perform in their future career 
pursuits as one of the main goals of education. 175 These 
pursuits fall into two categories: academic and vocational. In 
the academic realm, students compete for acceptance into post-
secondary education programs. In the job market, students vie 
for gainful employment. The preparation of students for their 
future career pursuits is accomplished by the education system 
164. Id.; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont /l, 703 
A.2d at 1359; Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997). 
165. Seattle, 585 P.2d at 94; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877. 
166. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, :397 (N .• J. 1990). 
167. Seattle, 585 P.2d at 72. 
168. Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896. 
169. Id.; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont II, 70:3 
A.2d at 1:359. 
170. Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896. 
171. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 397. 
172. Seattle, 585 P.2d at 94. 
173. Pinto. 662 So. 2d at 896. 
174. Seattle, 585 P.2d at 94. 
175. See, e.g., Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979) (describing an 
efficient education system as one that prepares its charges to pursue "useful and happy 
occupations"). 
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through the development of scholastic and employment 
skills. 176 Students should receive "sufficient training or 
preparation for advanced training in academic or vocational 
skills"177 so that they may engage in and contribute to the 
economy. 178 
The courts have described their desire to produce adults 
who are competitive in these fields in different ways. First, 
some are concerned with students' career decision-making 
process, saying that students should be equipped "to choose 
and pursue life work intelligently"179 and that they should be 
prepared "for useful and happy occupations." 180 Second, others 
want students who are successful in securing their desired 
positions, saying that they should be prepared to compete on an 
equal basis with others 181 or to compete favorably with their 
counterparts in surrounding states, 182 across the nation, and 
throughout the world 183 in academics or in the job market. 
Third, courts want students who can competently perform the 
tasks they undertake. Schools should develop students who can 
successfully engage in post-secondary education or vocational 
training184 and sustain competitive employment. 18 fi 
176. The vocational skills have not been defined by the courts. Academic skills 
include the foundational knowledge of mathematics, physical science, and language 
arts. 
177. Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896; see also Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 
S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (stating that the South Carolina Constitution requires that 
students "have the opportunity to acquire ... academic and vocational skills"); Pauley, 
255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (calling for the "development in every child to his or her capacity 
of ... work·training and advanced academic training as the child may intelligently 
choose"). 
178. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 485 (App. Div. 2001). 
179. Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896; Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 
(Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 
(Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont If), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 
(N.H. 1997). 
180. Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877. 
181. Leandro v. State, 4S8 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997). 
182. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont II, 703 A.2d 
at 1359. 
183. Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896. 
184. See id. ("Students [should be given] the opportunity to attain ... sufficient 
training, or preparation for advanced training, in academic or vocational skills, and 
sufficient guidance, to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently 
[and] sufficient training, or preparation for advanced training ... to compete favorably 
with their counterparts in Alabama, in surrounding states, across the nation, and 
throughout the world, in academics or in the job market."); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212 
(stating the same standard as the Pinto court); McDuffy, 615 So. 2d at 554 (stating the 
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c) Marketplace of ideas-political system -political pursuits 
Alabama, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New York, North Carolina, Washington, West Virginia 
The third key goal of the education system, as defined by 
the adequacy courts, is to train students to be future 
participants in the American political system. To do this, public 
schools should teach students basic history and geography, 186 
and provide them with a fundamental knowledge of economic, 
political187 and social systems. 188 Schools should also 
familiarize students with the government189 and governmental 
processes190 of their state and of the nation. 
The aim is to develop productive citizens who are capable of 
civic engagement191 through inte11igent and effective 
involvement in our political system. 192 This takes two forms, 
first, as members of a jury193 and second, as voters. 194 
To serve on juries, individuals need to be capable of being 
impartial, learning unfamiliar facts and concepts, deciding 
complex matters that require verbal, reasoning, math, and 
science skills, and communicating and reaching decisions with 
their fellow jurors.195 
As engaged voters who participate in our political system, 
same standard as the Pinto court); Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359; Leandro, 488 S.E.2d 
at 255; Abbeville County Sch. Dist v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (stating 
that every student must have the "opportunity to acquire ... academic and vocational 
skills"). 
185. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 487 (App. Div. 2001). 
186. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255; see also Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896 (including 
history, but not geography); Abbeville, 515 S.E.2d at 540 (requiring that students be 
given the opportunity to acquire, inter alia, a fundamental knowledge "of history and 
governmental processes"). 
187. Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 
554; Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359; Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255; Abbeville, 515 S.E.2d 
at 540. 
188. Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 
554; Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359; Abbeville, 515 S.E.2d at 540. 
189. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W.Va. 1979). 
190. See id. 
191. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign II), 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 487 
(App. Div. 2001). 
192. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978). 
193. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 
1995). 
194. Campaign II, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 485. 
195. Id. 
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these young adults will be able to understand the issues that 
affect their community, state, and nation, 196 to contribute to197 
and make informed choices198 regarding these issues as they 
relate to them personally199 or affect their community, state, 
and nation. 200 They will also be able to choose "among persons 
and issues that affect [their] own governance."201 Ultimately, 
the goal here is to produce citizens on whom the government 
may rely to meet its needs and to further its interests, 202 
thereby ensuring the survival of our open political system203 by 
producing intelligent and capable members of our political 
community. 
C. Accountability 
The third component of adequacy discussed by the courts is 
accountability. This concept demands that states not only 
provide high standards and sufficient funding for education, 
but that they also are held responsible for achieving the 
substantive level of education required by their constitution. 
One court defined it in this manner: 
Accountability means that the State must provide a 
definition of a constitutionally adequate education, the 
definition must have standards, and the standards must be 
subject to meaningful application so that it is possible to 
determine whether, in delegating its obligation to provide a 
constitutionally adequate education, the State has fulfilled its 
duty.204 
Accountability is the least developed element of the 
196. Pinto v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894, 896 (Ala.1995); Rose v. Council 
for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive 
Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 
(Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997). 
197. Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896. 
198. Id.; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont II, 703 
A.2d at 1:359; Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1996); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 
S.E.2d 859, 877 (W.Va. 1979). 
199. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255. 
200. Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896; Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255. 
201. Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877. 
202. McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555. 
203. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978). 
204. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont IV), 794 A.2d 744, 751 (N.H. 
2002). 
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adequacy lawsuits, 205 yet it serves the important function of 
putting into place a system for monitoring the state's progress 
towards and compliance with its constitutional responsibility to 
provide an adequate education to all of its children. 206 As one 
court noted, "If the State cannot be held accountable for 
fulfilling its duty, the duty creates no obligation and is no 
longer a duty."207 
The mechanisms for holding states responsible for fulfilling 
their constitutional responsibilities for public education can be 
implemented through the adoption of a formal accountability 
system or through a series of rulings by the courts on whether 
the government has fulfilled its obligations with respect to the 
state educational system. Two states with adequacy lawsuits 
have adopted formal accountability systems and in two others, 
courts have called for the creation of one.208 In at least six 
states, plaintiffs have utilized the court system to hold states 
accountable for providing adequate educational opportunities 
to their children. 209 
V. CONCLUSION 
Adequacy can be seen as another advance in the school 
reformers' quest to utilize the legal system to secure an 
education system that better serves the needs of all children 
within a state. With courts in twenty-one of the twenty-six 
states that have considered adequacy claims finding support 
for the legal theory of adequacy, these reformers have largely 
succeeded in the goal of enlisting state courts to advance their 
desire for sufficient funding for a quality education for all 
205. See Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 428-29 (N.J. 1997). 
206. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 u. Huckabee, No. 1992-5:318, slip op. at§ III, ,i 
48 (Ark. Ch. Ct. May 25, 2001) ("[T]here must he an effective accountability system 
that holds the schools accountable for results."); Claremont IV, 794 A.2d at 751; 
DeRolph v. State (De Rolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993, 101H-20 (Ohio 2000). 
207. Claremont IV, 794 A.2d at 751. 
208. The Massachusetts and Ohio Legislatures adopted formal accountability 
systems. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1137-38 (Mass. 2005); 
DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1017-1R The New York courts call for the development of 
one. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign III), 801 N.E.2d 326, :345-4 7 (N.Y. 
2003). The New Hampshire Court calls for a meaningful accountability in its decision. 
Claremont IV, 794 A.2d at 758. 
209. Arizona, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Texas have a 
series of adequacy court decisions. See Appendix 1 for a list of cases. 
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students within a state. The decisions, however, form a 
patchwork of legal precedence on adequacy that was created by 
the often ambiguous state constitutional education provisions, 
in light of the underlying state school finance systems and the 
evidence of inadequacy within the existing public school 
systems. 
To develop a better understanding of the theory of 
adequacy, this paper examined these decisions to identify their 
similarities and differences, providing a comparative analysis 
on several key aspects of adequacy theory, cross-referenced to 
the outcomes in individual states. The result is a set of 
similarities that is intended to provide the reader with a deeper 
understanding of adequacy and the requirements governing 
state provision of a high minimum quality education. 
Although this paper is organized around the three 
components of adequacy-funding, educational goals, and 
accountability-these categories are not required to be 
addressed in a successful adequacy case. Adequacy as a theory 
is most often associated with its financial component because 
these lawsuits, at their essence, have a primary goal of 
obligating the states to spend more money on their public 
school systems. This goal can be met without defining the 
specific educational goals the state should pursue in the 
education of its children and without providing for an 
accountability mechanism to guarantee that its standards are 
attained. In fact, many would argue that these two functions 
fall within the authority of the legislatures, not the courts. 210 
And so, the educational funding question continues to serve 
as the focus of the adequacy lawsuits as courts attempt to 
determine whether their state is providing sufficient financial 
resources to fund a high minimum quality education. This 
adequate funding level could be represented by either 
horizontal equity, substantial equality in access to financial 
resources, or vertical equity, obligating the state to offer a 
comparable base level of educational opportunity to its 
students throughout the state. Interestingly, the adequacy 
rulings typically do not mandate the same level of funding in 
210. See, e.g., Coal. For Adequacy and Fairness v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 407-08 
(Fla. 1996); Comm. For Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1193 (Ill. 1996); 
Charlet v. Louisiana, 713 So. 2d 1199, 1205 (La. 1998); Marerro v. Pennsylvania, 709 
A.2d 956, 965-66 (Pa. 1997); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57-59 (R.I. 
1995). 
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every district. Instead, they recognize the state's ability to 
provide extra funding for districts whose student population or 
physical location translate into higher costs to provide the 
same level of educational programs as in other districts. In 
some instances, they also permit local communities to 
supplement the educational offerings in their school districts 
beyond the base-level adequate education supplied by the state. 
Several adequacy courts did address the relevant 
educational goals that should be pursued by the state. They 
envision an educational system that prepares students to 
assume their three primary roles in society as citizens, 
workers, and participants in the political system. These courts 
want schools to develop students as individuals who are 
prepared to engage in intellectual pursuits. They should have a 
general knowledge about academic subjects, our culture, and 
our society. Students should also be prepared to compete for 
jobs and entrance into higher educational institutions. They 
must be trained to assume their roles as productive members of 
our society. In addition, these courts see the survival of our 
democratic form of government as dependent upon our future 
members' ability to intelligently analyze and choose among the 
issues and alternatives presented to them in their roles as 
voters and members of juries. 
The issue of holding states accountable for actually 
achieving the educational objectives delineated in a few of 
these cases is something that is not satisfactorily addressed by 
most of these decisions. While many courts are motivated by 
their desire to not overstep their bounds into an area that is 
controlled by the legislature, it seems as if more could be done 
with this issue. Even in the current climate of standards-based 
accountability in this country, which has been heightened by 
the No Child Left Behind Act, the accountability measures 
undertaken by the states through testing and reporting of 
results do not begin to address the breadth of the educational 
goals that the adequacy courts describe. 211 It is possible that 
these broad intellectual, political, and career goals are meant 
to be merely hortatory, ideals that we ascribe to in our 
democratic society. It is also likely that these goals would be 
211. The No Child Left Behind Act requires only "yearly student academic 
assessments that include ... mathematics, reading or language arts, and science." 20 
U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(A). 
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very difficult to measure. However, if these are the actual goals 
of the American educational system, more attention should be 
paid to determining how and whether they are being 
accomplished in the educational program offered to our 
children in our public schools. 
In this way, the adequacy wave of the school finance reform 
movement progresses beyond the previous two waves of reform 
with an exclusive focus on the finance of education through 
measurements of educational inputs, tackling a broader array 
of the significant challenges faced by public schools. It 
encompasses not only the financial issues, but also the relevant 
educational goals and achievement results of the students. 
With so many state courts siding with adequacy reformers, one 
should expect to see further pushes in other states to use 
adequacy rulings to drive substantive education reform in 
years to come. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Alabama 
[2007 
Ala. Coal. for Equity v. Hunt, CV-90-883-R & CV-91-0117-R 
(Ala. Cir. Ct. March 31, 1993), in appendix of Opinion of the 
Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (finding public 
education system unconstitutional under education and equal 
protection clause). 
Pinto v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894 (Ala. 1995) 
(affirming circuit court decision regarding the 
unconstitutionality of public education system). 
Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002) (sua sponte 
dismissal of equity funding case). 
Alaska 
Kasayulie v. State, NO. 3AN-97-3782 CIV (Alaska Super. 
Ct. Sept. 1, 1999) (holding that the method of financing capital 
funding projects for education was unconstitutional under both 
the education and equal protection clauses). 
Arizona 
Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 
806 (Ariz. 1994) (finding unconstitutional the financing scheme 
for public school facilities under the education clause). 
Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 74 P.3d 
258 (Ariz. 2003) (reversing the lower court's judgment due to 
insufficient evidence of inadequate funding for public school 
facilities). 
Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (Ariz. 1997) (new capital 
funding system not sufficient to meet education clause 
requirements). 
Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634 (Ariz. 1998) (new capital 
funding system still not sufficient to meet education clause 
requirements). 
Arkansas 
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, No. 1992-5318 
(Ark. Ch. Ct. May 25, 2001) (declaring the public school system 
inequitable and inadequate under the equality and education 
provisions). 
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 
(Ark. 2002) (affirming the lower court decision). 
Idaho 
Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d 
913 (Idaho 1998) (remanding case for trial on potential 
violation of education clause for facilities funding). 
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Kansas212 
Montoy v. State (Montoy II), 102 P.3d 1160 (Kan. 2005) 
(lack of suitable funding for middle and large districts with 
high minority, at-risk, and special education population 
violates education clause), supplemental opinion at 112 P.3d 
923 (Kan. 2005) (new financing system still unconstitutionally 
inadequate because of over-reliance on local revenues). 
Montoy v. State (Montoy III), 138 P.3d 755 (Kan. 2006) 
(case dismissed because legislature in substantial compliance 
with court order on school finance formula). 
Kentucky 
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) 
(declaring school system unconstitutional under education 
clause). 
Maryland 
Bradford v. Md. State Bd. of Educ., Case No. 
95258055/CL20251 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 2004) 
(finding the Baltimore school system unconstitutionally 
inadequate). 
Massachusetts 
McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 
N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993) (declaring the educational system 
unconstitutional under the education clause because it fails to 
provide education without regard to the fiscal capacity of the 
community or district in which the children live). 
Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005) 
(rejecting the conclusion that the State is not meeting its 
educational obligations, terminating jurisdiction in the case). 
Montana 
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 
(Mont. 1989) (finding that Montana's public school funding 
system violates its education clause). 
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 784 P.2d 412 
(Mont. 1990) (delaying the effect of 1989 decision until 1991 to 
give legislature time to adopt new educational funding 
scheme). 
Columbia Falls Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257 
(Mont. 2005) (finding the educational product of the public 
school system constitutionally deficient and the funding 
212. Montoy v. Kansas (Montoy 1), 62 P.3d 228 (Kan. 200:3) (overturning summary 
disposition and remanding case to trial). 
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insufficient). 
New Hampshire 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont [), 635 A.2d 
1375 (N.H. 1993) (finding the public school finance system 
violated the education clause). 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1[), 703 A.2d 
1353 (N.H. 1997) (finding the educational funding system 
unconstitutional because of the differing tax burdens between 
districts). 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont Ill), 744 A.2d 
1107 (N.H. 1999) (declaring the phase-in feature of property 
tax system unconstitutional). 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont IV), 794 A.2d 
7 44 (N.H. 2002) (holding that accountability is an essential 
component of the State's educational duty, and the current 
accountability system constitutionally deficient). 
New Jersey 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott [), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985) 
(remanding case to administrative agency). 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1[), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) 
(finding a violation of the education clause in the poor urban 
districts). 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott Ill), 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) 
(holding the Quality Education Act unconstitutional for failing 
to achieve financial parity for regular education expenditures 
between special needs districts and richer districts). 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997) 
(finding the Comprehensive Educational Improvement and 
Finance Act insufficiently addresses the needs of special needs 
districts, is not calculated in a manner that relates to student 
needs, does not address facilities deficiencies, and does not 
address the extra educational needs of poor students). 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998) 
(ordering the implementation of improvement plan that 
includes preschool). 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VI), 748 A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000) 
(finding that the preschool program IS not properly 
implemented in the poor, urban districts). 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VI[), 832 A.2d 891 (N.J. 2003) 
(ordering the implementation of the mediated settlement 
between the parties). 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VII[), 857 A.2d 173 (N.J. 2004) 
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(relaxing the requirements for certification of preschool 
teachers subject to specified conditions). 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IX), 862 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2004) 
(ordering the parties to participate in mediation). 
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) 
(finding the New Jersey education funding system 
unconstitutional because it violates the education clause's 
"thorough and efficient" requirement). 
Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973). 
Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1975). 
Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976). 
Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976). 
New Mexico 
Zuni Sch. Dist. v. State, CV-98-14-II (N.M. Dist. Ct. Oct. 14, 
1999). 
New York 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign I), 655 
N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995). 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign II), 719 
N.Y.S.2d 475 (App. Div. 2001). 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign Ill), 801 
N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003). 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Campaign IV), 816 
N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006). 
North Carolina 
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997). 
Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 
2004). 
Ohio 
DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). 
DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000). 
DeRolph v. State (DeRolph III), 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 
2001). 
DeRolph v. State (DeRolph IV), 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002). 
South Carolina 
Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 
1999). 
Texas 
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 
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S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991). 
Carrollton-Farmers Branch lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood 
lndep. Sch. Dist. (Edgewood Ill), 826 S.W.2d 489 (1992). 
Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist.v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 893 
S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1995), modified opinion at Edgewood lndep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995). 
West Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558 
(Tex. 2003). 
Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D., 176 S.W.3d 746 
(Tex. 2005). 
Washington 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). 
West Virginia 
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979). 
Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W.Va. 1984). 
Wyoming 
Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State (Campbell!), 907 P.2d 
1238 (Wyo. 1995). 
State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist. (Campbell II), 19 P.3d 
518 (Wyo. 2001). 
State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist. (Campbell Ill), 32 P.3d 
325 (Wyo. 2003). 
